









In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed
to observe public signals according to some exogenous distributions for
free. We deviate from this assumption in two directions to model mon-
itoring structure in a more realistic way. We assume that signals are
private rather than public and that each player needs to actively mon-
itor the other player with some costs. In each stage, a player decides
whether to monitor the other player with some costs in addition to
which action to take. We ﬁrst provide a class of strategies which
approximate eﬃciency and examine its interesting properties, among
them are (1) each player monitors the other player randomly like “ran-
dom auditing” to reduce monitoring costs and (2) players cheat and
m o n i t o ra tt h es a m et i m ein their cooperative phase. In particular,
this implies that cheating may happen (randomly) during collusion for
t h es a k eo fe ﬃciency.
Then we discuss multi-task partnership games with endogenous
monitoring, where two players play H games (tasks) instead of one.
The additional twist is that we allow each player to choose freely which
tasks to monitor. Our main result is that, how large the monitoring
cost per task is, the eﬃcient outcome can be approximated as play-
ers become patient when there are enough many tasks. This result
suggests that the size of a partnership may tend to be large when
monitoring is not free.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In any long term relationship, the nature of available information is critical
for successful cooperation or collusion. For example, any kind of trigger
strategy based on retaliation can be useful only when there exists a reliable
signal which helps a player to detect the other players’ cheating. Thus many
researchers have been led to investigate what eﬀects diﬀerent information
structure may have on long term relationships. Many works has shown that
information structure indeed has a signiﬁcant impact on the nature of long
term relationships. One of the most famous such examples is a paper by
Green and Porter [10], which showed that price war is necessary for collusion
with imperfect monitoring unlike perfect monitoring case.
In this paper, we also propose to study an information structure which
has not been explored thoroughly before in the context of long term relation-
ships, namely, endogenous (costly) monitoring. The standard assumption
is that players receive public signals according to some exogenous distribu-
tions for free. There are at least two important aspects of real information
processing which are missing from this picture. First, signals are often
private rather than public. It is rarely the case that every player knows
what the other players know. Second, the process of acquiring information
and the costs of monitoring are not present. We explicitly assume that
players can obtain reasonably accurate private signals by paying some costs
in addition to free private/public signals available. Players play a given
stage game and, at the same time, also decide whether to monitor the other
players with some costs or not. We also assume that monitoring reveals
enough (imperfect) information about the other player’s monitoring activity
as well.
We ﬁrst provide a class of strategies which approximate eﬃciency and
describe some of its interesting properties. First, we ﬁnd that a player
monitors the other player randomly like “random auditing” to reduce mon-
itoring costs. If no monitoring is done, proper incentive for cooperation is
not provided. On the other hand, if monitoring occurs every period, the
eﬃciency is not obtained due to monitoring costs. Thus monitoring needs
to be done randomly to approximate the eﬃcient outcomes. Second, players
cheat and monitor at the same time in their cooperative phase. In partic-
ular, this implies that cheating may happen (randomly) during collusion for
eﬃciency reason.1 Note that, as observed by Ellison [6] and many others,
1This can also happen for a model where cheati n gp r o v i d e sb e t t e ri n f o r m a t i o na b o u t
the other player’s cheating (Kandori and Obara [11]). Our extra contribution here is to
identify a more natural setting where such mixing behavior is optimal. ( it’s less clear
2standard theory predicts cheating does not occur during cooperative phase
of collusion, but cheating does happen all the time. Third, it is crucial for
our construction that the gain from cheating is larger than the monitoring
cost. In another word, we need that the monitoring cost is “ﬁnanced” by a
deviation gain on the spot when they deviate and monitor at the same time.
Finally, our equilibrium is robust in the sense that it is independent of ex-
ogenous information structure. What information is available to players
besides explicit monitoring is totally irrelevant to our construction.
Then we discuss multi-task partnership games with endogenous moni-
toring, where two players play H games (tasks) instead of one. Each player
can monitor the other player with some costs as before. The additional
twist is that we allow each player to choose freely which tasks to monitor.
Our main result is that, how large the monitoring cost per task is, the eﬃ-
cient outcome can be approximated w h e nt h e r ei sal a r g ee n o u g hn u m b e ro f
tasks as players become patient. Our result is likely to hold for very general
class of stage games although we model each task as a prisoners’ dilemma
game for the sake of simple exposition. This result suggests that the size
of a partnership tends to be large when active monitoring is important.
In equilibrium, players randomize between “cooperating for all the tasks”
and “deviating for all the tasks and monitoring some randomly selected sub-
set of tasks”. Remember that one of the important conditions in the basic
model is that the monitoring cost can be ﬁnanced by deviation gain. This
condition turns out to be more easily satisﬁed with many tasks because the
players need to monitor only a certain number of tasks independent of H
while they deviate for all H tasks. This equilibrium is based on the idea
of Ely and Välimäki [8] or Kandori and Obara [11], but more complicated
than the examples in those papers.
This multi-task model can be also interpreted as a model of multimarket
contact if we regard the two players as two big ﬁrms competing in many
separate markets. Edwards [5] argued that bigger conglomerates may have
a better ability to sustain implicit collusion between them. His claim has
been supported by many empirical works. Our result with endogenous
monitoring may provide a theoretical foundation for this claim.2
when [11]’s assumption is reasonable). This insight relies on a separation of cheating
action and monitoring action, which just happens to be one action in [11]. Note also
that our reasoning is a bit more twisted than [11]. We ﬁrst argue that players need to
randomly monitor the other players in the cooperative phase, then go on to show that it
is useful to ﬁnance the cost of monitoring by cheating, thus obtaining random cheating
behavior in the cooperative phase.
2Matsushima [12] also demonstrated that multimarket contact may help to sustain
3We describe the model and some preliminary results in the next section.
In Section 3, we introduce an equilibrium which we call “two state machine
equilibrium” and discuss its interesting properties. Section 4 is devoted to
multi-task partnership games. The last section discusses related literature.
2 The Model and Some Preliminary Results
2.1 The Model
Let us suppose that there are two players i =1 ,2. An action of player i is
ai =( ei,m i) ∈ Ai ≡ Ei ×{ M,N}.
The ﬁrst element ei is the strategy of the stage game in the usual sense, and
we call it “eﬀort” to avoid confusion. The second element mi represents the
monitoring activity. mi = M represents “to monitor”, while N represents
“not to monitor”. We assume that the monitoring activity entails cost
K>0 and perfectly reveals both (1) the rival’s action and (2) monitoring
activity. Both assumptions are basically made for the sake of simplicity. We
can allow almost perfect private monitoring of actions, for which our results
holds approximately. (2) is even less crucial than (1). Indeed we only
need that monitoring activity reveals enough information about the rival’s
monitoring activity as we will argue.
The stage game payoﬀ is
gi(a)=
½
ui(e1,e 2) − K if mi = M
ui(e1,e 2) if mi = N
Let ωi =( yi,b aj) ∈ Ωi ≡ Yi ×{ Aj ∪ {0}} be player i’s signal, where b aj = aj
with probability one if monitoring action mi = M is taken, and otherwise
b aj =0with probability one. Free signals yi can be either pubic or pri-
vate. Player i0s strategy is a mapping from all t-period private histories
hi
t =( ( ai,1,ωi,1),...,(ai,t−1,ωi,t−1)) to Ai. We assume that players’ payoﬀs
are given by average discounted stage game payoﬀs ,a n de m p l o ys e q u e n t i a l
equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.
Remark
• Note that monitoring is in general essential for sustaining any level of
cooperation. An extreme example would be a stage game for which
implicit collusion using a model with imperfect public monitoring.
4yi is almost uninformative. For such games, you can only support
a repetition of the stage game Nash equilibrium without monitoring.
On the other hand, if players monitor the other players every period,
this game is reduced to one of the games with perfect monitoring,t h u s
every payoﬀ proﬁle (minus monitoring cost)c a nb es u p p o r t e db yF o l k
Theorem [9].3 However, it may not be wise to monitor every period
because it is costly. This suggests that we need to ﬁnd more creative
way of monitoring than such crude one to approximate fully eﬃcient
outcomes.
2.2 Kandori and Obara (2003)
In this subsection, we brieﬂy describe some of the results from Kandori
and Obara [11], which are relevant to this project. In [11], we proposed an
equilibrium called “two state machine” for repeated games with two players.
It consists of two states; “Reward state” R and “Punishment state” P.I n
the beginning of the game, players are at R. T h e yp l a yab e h a v i o rs t r a t e g y
αR in R and move to P with diﬀerent probabilities according to diﬀerent
realizations of action-signal pair. Similarly, they play a behavior strategy
αP in P and move back to R in a similar way. The trick is to choose
transition probabilities so that players have the incentive to choose αR and
αP in respective states.
We found a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such machine to be an
equilibrium. It consists of a few lines of linear (in)equalities;
(LI) For i,j =1 ,2,t h e r ee x i s txR
i : Ωi×AR







j ) − E[xR
i (ωj,a j)|ai,αR
j ] (1)
∀ai / ∈ A∗
i V R
i = gi(ai,αR




















i is the union of the support of αR
i and αP
i .
3However, if monitoring is almost perfect but not perfect, some information remain
private through the game. Many simple equilibria based on perfect information cease
to be an equilibrium even with such slight perturbation of information structure. Our
equilibrium is robust to any such perturbation of information structure.
5Here we give only a brief intuition as the space is limited. You can regard
xR
i (ωj,a j) as punishments and xP
i (ωj,a j) as rewards for player i. (1) and
(2) implies that, if player j is in state R (hence playing αR
j ), player i0s total
payoﬀ is V R
i independent of the action in A∗
i player i choose, and it is lower
than V R
i if player i plays anything else. Similarly, (3) and (4) implies that,
if player j is in state P, player i0st o t a lp a y o ﬀ is V P
i independent of the action
in A∗
i, and it is lower than V P
i otherwise. In conclusion, these inequalities
guarantee that player i is always indiﬀerent among any action in A∗
i given
that player j is playing this two state machine. This in turn implies that
this two state machine is indeed a best response to itself. Note that, since a
player does not need any information about the other player’s state, this two
state machine equilibrium is an equilibrium even though many information
is not public.
Condition (LI) reveals that there is a certain restriction on αR and αP
that can be used for a two state machine equilibrium:
Proposition 1 The (potentially mixed) actions used in a two-state machine
equilibrium αR
i and αP
i ,a n dt h e i rs u p p o r tA∗










Proof. Condition (1) and the non-negativity of xR
i implies gi(ai,αR
j ) ≥
V R for all ai ∈ A∗
i. In contrast, (3), (4), and the non-negativity of xP
i shows
V P ≥ gi(ai,αP




i > maxai∈Ai gi(ai,αP
j ).
The separation condition is necessary for a two-state machine equilib-
rium, but it is also suﬃcient under “good observability”. “Good observ-
ability” roughly means that, for any j0sa c t i o naj ∈ Aj, there exists an
action-signal pair (ωi,a i) for i 6= j such that ωi is very unlikely to be ob-




very large for any a0
j 6= aj).
Proposition 2 The separation condition is suﬃcient for existence of
two state machine equilibrium which uses αR
i ,αP
i and achieves V R
i =m i n ai∈A∗
i gi(ai,αR
j ),
i =1 ,2 under good observability.
Proof. See Kandori and Obara [11].
63 Endogenous Monitoring
Now we apply the above result to repeated games with endogenous moni-
toring to obtain our ﬁrst result. The key is to treat a pair (ei,m i) as an
action ai in (LI).
Theorem 3 Let e∗ be an eﬃcient proﬁle and suppose that the following






j) − K ≥ ui(e∗), (7)
ui(eP
i ,e ∗





Then, (u1(e∗),u 2(e∗)) is approximately attained as the discount factor tends
to unity.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof is a relatively straightforward adaptation of the above results
from [11] To provide a ﬂavor of the result, below we describe an explicit
e x a m p l eo fe q u i l i b r i aw eu s ei nt h ep r o o f .
Suppose that the stage game is given by Prisoners’ Dilemma game, whose
payoﬀ
ui(ei)=E[πi(ei,y i)|ei]





where d,l > 0 (D is a dominant strategy) and 2 > 1+d − l ((C,C) is
eﬃcient). We interpret C as e∗
i and D as eP
i in terms of the above suﬃcient
condition.
We consider the following two state machine; (1) In state R,p l a y e r
i chooses (C,N) with probability (1 − ε) and (D,M) with probability ε.
He moves to P only when D is observed, with probability one for (D,N)
and probability ρR ∈ [0,1] for (D,M). (2) In state P, player i chooses
(D,M),a n dm o v e sb a c kt oR with probability ρP
C when C is observed and
7with probability ρP








are chosen so that the following inequal-
ities are satisﬁed for some V R >VP
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V R + ερRV Pª
(12)







(1 − ε)V R + εV Pª
(13)




















V P ≥ δV P (16)
where the incentive constraints for (C,M) are omitted as they are trivial.
This system of inequalities basically corresponds to (LI).4
When d ≥ K ((7)), we can ﬁnd a solution for (11), (12), (14), and (15)
for any small ε as δ → 1 and (13) is automatically satisﬁed for large δ. It
is clear that this two state machine is a sequential equilibrium with such
parameters (Ely and Välimäki [8], [11]). Moreover, the equilibrium payoﬀ





from (11), which converges to 1 as ε → 0.
3.1 Examples
We examine when the separation conditions (7), (8) and (9) are satisﬁed
through some examples.
Example 1: Cournot Competition.
Consider a standard symmetric cournot competition model with two





0 and a smooth convex cost function Ci (qi)). We assume strategic substitu-
tion. Let qCN and q∗ be the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the most
collusive symmetric output proﬁle respectively. Let qD











qi − Ci (qi). We can check separability condition by setting
e∗ = q∗,e P
i = qCN
i , and eD
i = qD
i . (7) is satisﬁed if monitoring cost is
























8small enough because. (9) is satisﬁed as the right hand side is at most the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium payoﬀ and πi (q∗) > πi
¡
qCN¢













where strategic substitution is used in deriving the second inequality.
Example 2: Bertrand Competition (Secret Price Cutting)
Consider a simple symmetric Bertrand model with linear demand func-
tions Di (p)=α − βpi + γpj + εi and linear cost functions C (qi)=cqi














(7) is clearly satisﬁed if the monitoring cost is small. It is easy to verify





≥ πi (p∗) (for (8)) is an interval
£
p,p ∗¤
. So we can ﬁnd the punishment action eP
i to satisfy (8) and (9) if
a n do n l yi fp = p∗ −
γ(p∗−c)





this condition is satisﬁed or not depends on parameters. For example,
(α,β,γ)=( 1 ,2,1) satisﬁes this condition.
Note that eﬃciency can be achieved without monitoring if the joint dis-
tribution of private signals (quantities) satisﬁes a certain type of conditional
independency as shown in Matsushima [13]. Our contribution lies in the
case where such restriction is not satisﬁed.
Remark.
• Note that in the price competition case eﬃciency is achieved if the
joint distribution of quantities satisﬁes a certain condition (a weaker
version of conditional independence: see Matsushima’s paper about
Secret Price Cuts). Our contribution lies in the case where such
restriction is not satisﬁed.
3.2 Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring
As we mentioned, perfect monitoring of monitoring is not necessary. Sup-
pose that each player observes the rival’s eﬀort level perfectly, but receives
an imperfect signal zi which only depends on the rival’s monitoring activity.
As long as there is some information contained in zi, we can pick a function
zi → f (zi) ∈ [0,1] such that 0 ≤ E [f (zi)|mj = M] <E[f (zi)|mj = N] ≤
1.5 Let E [fi (zi)|mj = N]=ηN,E[f (zi)|mj = M]=ηM. We can mod-
ify the above two state machine as follows. In R, players move to P with
5We assume symmetry here for the sake of simplicity.
9probability ρRf (zi) after D is observed. In P, players move back to R with
probability ρP
D (1 − f (zi)) when D is observed.
Now we need to replace (12), (13), (15), and (16) with the following four
inequalities;













V R + ερRηMV Pª
(17)









V R + ερRηNV Pª
(18)
V P =( 1 − δ)(−K)+δ
©
ερP
D (1 − ηM)V R +
¡
1 − ερP




V P ≥ δ
©
ερP
D (1 − ηN)V R +
¡
1 − ερP




We can show that (18) and (20) are automatically satisﬁed if
ηN
ηM is large
enough, that is, each player’s monitoring is enough informative about the
rival’s monitoring activity (
ηN
ηM = ∞ when monitoring is perfectly observed).
Again, when d ≥ K,w ec a nﬁnd a solution for (11), (13), (17), and (19) for
any small ε as δ → 1, thus obtaining eﬃciency.6
4M u l t i - t a s k P a r t n e r s h i p G a m e s
In this section, we study multi-task partnership game with endogenous mon-
itoring, where two players play many games (tasks) instead of one. In the
previous model, there are only two options for players; “monitor” or “not
to monitor”. Here we assume that each player can also decide which task
to monitor. Note that the level of cooperation they can achieve may be
aﬀected in a nontrivial way by the number of the tasks in which they are
involved. There are two opposing eﬀects from increasing the number of the
tasks. First, if there are more tasks, the stake for the partnership is larger,
which might facilitate more cooperation. On the other hand, monitoring
gets more diﬃcult and costly as the number of diﬀerent tasks is increasing.
We are interested in whether more dependence (more tasks) leads to more
cooperation or vice versa. Below we illustrate that the eﬃcient outcome
is asymptotically achieved (so the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second) as the
number of the tasks increases. Moreover, this result holds however large the
monitoring cost per task is. This suggests that the “size” of a partnership
tends to be large when it is diﬃcult to obtain useful (public) information
about the partner’s behavior without active monitoring.
6Note that almost perfect monitoring of monitoring is not necessary for our eﬃciency
result, while (almost) perfect monitoring of the eﬀort level is crucial for the (almost)
eﬃciency result.
10Let h =1 ,...,H be an index for diﬀerent tasks. We assume that each
task corresponds to the above Prisoner’s dilemma game for simplicity, but
it can be generalized to a very broad class of games. Player i’s eﬀort vector
is given by ei =( e1
i,e 2
i,...,e H
i ). The vector of outcomes observed by player
i is yi =( y1
i ,...,yH
i ). The signal for each task depend on the eﬀort proﬁle
in that task only, independently over the tasks. We assume that, if player
i monitors task h, i observes (1) the rival’s eﬀort in task h and (2) whether
the rival monitors task h. As we claimed before, these assumptions are
basically made for simplicity. Formally, player i’s signal is represented as







j ∈ Aj ∪ {0}. It is assumed that
the cost per task is K.
First, let’s try to apply the previous theorem directly to the current
situation as a benchmark. If the counterparts of the separation conditions
(7)-(9), namely
H (1 + d) − KH ≥ H (21)
H (1 + d) ≥ H
H>0
are satisﬁed, the eﬃcient payoﬀ is approximately achieved by a strategy
which cheats & monitor in all the tasks simultaneously with a small prob-
ability. The last two conditions are by deﬁnition satisﬁed. The ﬁrst
(“ﬁnancing”) condition is equivalent to
d ≥ K (22)
Note that this is equivalent to the condition with one task case and indepen-
dent of the number of the tasks. Thus there is no advantage or disadvantage
of having many tasks with such a strategy proﬁle.
Nonetheless, we can approximate the eﬃcient outcome by employing a
slightly diﬀerent strategy which cheats in all the tasks and monitor some
randomly selected subset of tasks simultaneously with a small probability.
Moreover we can do so how large the monitoring cost per task is, as long as
there are enough tasks. Notice the subtlety involved in our construction of
equilibrium two state machine. Suppose that players are playing some two
state machine and indiﬀerent between the full cooperation and cheating &
monitoring in all the tasks as in the above benchmark case. Then one of the
optimal strategy for each player is to cheat & monitor in all the tasks after
every history. However, this implies that each player’s discounted average
payoﬀ cannot exceed H (1 + d)−KH, which is far below the eﬃcient payoﬀ
11H if K>d . Therefore it should be suboptimal to cheat and monitor
in all the tasks to approximate the eﬃcient outcome. On the other hand,
every task needs to be monitored with some probability. No task without
monitoring contributes to the eﬃciency for obvious reason. This observation
compels us to construct a two state machine where players monitor in some
randomly selected subset of tasks simultaneously with a small probability.
Note that the strategy we propose is much more complicated than a
simple two state machine in Ely and Välimäki [8] or examples in Kandori
and Obara [11] in the sense that playing certain actions are not optimal.
It is not a trivial matter to incorporate such strict incentive compatibilities
while explicitly constructing two state machine7, and that is indeed the main
technical contribution of the following theorem.
Theorem 4 For any level of monitoring cost K, there exists H such that,
for any H ≥ H, the eﬃcient outcome (H,H) is approximately attained as
the discount factor tends to unity.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.1 Generalization
While we used a rather special class of game; Prisoners’ Dilemma, our ef-
ﬁciency result survives in much more general settings. The above result
can be generalized in two directions. First, the stage game can be any two
person normal form game as long as appropriate separation conditions
are satisﬁed. Second, the cost of monitoring can be represented by a con-
vex functions Ci (h).i =1 ,2 rather than linear functions. Let HG be a
multi-task partnership game where each task of the H tasks corresponds to
normal form game G. We can obtain the following more general theorem.
Theorem 5 8 Let G be any two person normal form game and e∗ be an
eﬃcient proﬁle of G. Suppose that the following separation conditions
hold for i =1 ,2, j 6= i, with some “punishing actions” eP
1 , eP
2 ;
di =m a x
ei
ui(ei,e ∗
j) − ui(e∗) > 0, and
7Although such strict incentive compatibility can be easily incorporated into two state
machines as is clear from (LI) or a general formulation by Ely, Horner, Olszewski [7],
there are not many explicit examples. Matsushima [13] is one example of explicit two
state machines for which strict incentive compatibility plays an important role.
8Note that this result is already very close to Nash reversion Folk theorem as e
∗ does





Suppose also that the cost functions for monitoring satisﬁes hdi − C0
i (h) >
0,i=1 ,2 as h →∞ .9 Then there exists H such that, for any H ≥ H, the
eﬃcient out come ((Hu1(e∗),Hu 2(e∗))) for HG is approximately attained
as the discount factor tends to unity.
This result implies that eﬃciency is obtained for the Bertrand stage game
in Example 2 without any restriction on the parameters as long as there are
many markets in which the two ﬁrms compete.
4.2 Multimarket contact
The multi-task model can be reinterpreted as a model of multimarket con-
tact if we regard the two players as two big ﬁrms competing in H separate
markets. Edwards [5] argued that bigger conglomerates may have a bet-
ter ability to sustain implicit collusion between them. His claim has been
supported by many empirical works. Our result with endogenous monitor-
ing may provide a theoretical foundation for this claim once a theorem for
general two person stage games is developed more.
5 Related Literature
We discuss related literature brieﬂy. The most closely related works are Ben-
Porath and Kahneman [4] and Miyagawa, Miyahara, and Sekiguchi [14]. The
ﬁrst paper proves a folk theorem for general discounted repeated games with
communication when perfect monitoring is possible with some costs. While
our result is not ready to be applied to games with more than two players,
we do not allow communication among players. The second paper proves
a folk theorem for a class of stage games (without communication) when
players are patient enough. There are two main diﬀerences between our
work and their work. First, they focus on the limit case where monitoring
cost is almost negligible, while we deal with the ﬁxed level of monitoring cost.
Second, they assume that there is no signal about monitoring activity. On
the other hand, we assume that players can observe some informative signal
about the other players’ monitoring activity while monitoring himself.
Our work is also related to works on repeated games with private mon-
itoring. The basic idea behind two state machine was ﬁrst proposed by
9Note that this condition is trivially satisﬁed when C (H) is linear, the case treated
above.
13Piccione [16] in the context of repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect
private monitoring. It was further simpliﬁed and developed to the current
style of two state machine by Ely and Välimäki [8], Obara [15], and Kandori
and Obara [11]. In particular, our Proposition in Section 2 is borrowed
directly from [11].
As for applications and extensions, we have already mentioned Mat-
sushima [12] for multimarket contact. There are a few attempts to model
c o l l u s i o nw i t hp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ns u c ha sA o y a g i[ 1 ] ,A t h e y ,B a g w e l la n d
Sanchirico [3] and Athey and Bagwell [2]. But they are diﬀerent from our
model in that they use communication extensively.
14Appendix.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3.
Proof. The proof is a direct application of our Linear Inequality char-
acterization of two-state machines. We use R and P to denote “reward” and
“punishment” states. Let AZ
i b et h es u p p o r to fαZ












i ,M)=ε,w h e r eeD
i ∈
argmaxei ui(ei,e ∗
j) (i.e. cheat and monitor at the same time with a small
















i ,M)=ε. Then these αR
i and αP
i ,i=1 ,2 s a t i s f ys e p a r a t i o nc o n d i -
















the separation condition is also suﬃcient. Hence there exists a two state ma-
chine equilibrium with such αR
i and αP
i to achieve V R
i =m i n ai∈A∗
i gi(ai,αR
j ),i=
1,2,j6= i, which is approximately ui(e∗) if we choose ε very small.
The following argument, which follows a general line of proof of Propo-
sition 2, shows how to ﬁnd x(·) to satisfy (LI) for such αR
i and αP
i ,i=1 ,2.
For simplicity, suppose that (7) and (8) holds with strict inequality. First,
we can set xR






or he deviates and monitors at the same time, but








.T h i si m -



















, we can choose xR











j ) − E[xR
i (ωj,a j)|ai,αR
j ]
This can be done because the conditions (7) and (8) hold strictly and ε is
small. Finally, for any other b ai with aj =( eD
i ,M),x R
i (·) can be set very
large so that (2) is satisﬁed. In this way, we can ﬁnd xR
i to satisfy both (1)
and (2) given (7) and (8).
In a similar way, we can arrange xP
i (·) = 0 so that
∀ai ∈ Ai V P







, hence both (3) and (4) are trivially satisﬁed.

















P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 .
Proof. F i xa ni n t e g e rG so that d>K
G for i =1 ,2. We use the following
two state machine. Let CN =( ( C,N),...,(C,N)) and DMG be playing D
for all the tasks and monitoring some G tasks. At state R, player i plays
CN with probability 1−ε and play one of DMG with equal probability with











be i0s deviation gain for
each task when player j is in state R. At state P, player i just plays DMG.
We deﬁne xR as follows;
xR
i ((yj,b ai),a j)
=

              
              
0 if (1) aj = CN or (2) aj = DMG and observe only (C,N)
XR − Y 0
R if (1) aj = DMG and (2) observe (D,M)
1 ∼ G − 1 times and (D,N) for the rest
XR + Y 00
R if (1) aj = DMG and (2) observe (D,M) G times
XR if (1) aj = DMG and (2) observe only (D,N)
XR + Y 000
R otherwise
Since xR =0when CN is played, this machine clearly approximates the
eﬃcient payoﬀ proﬁle (H,H) as ε → 0. We show that (LI) is satisﬁed for
an appropriate choice of XR,Y0
R,Y00
R,Y000
R . We omit subscript from now on.
First of all, we only need to deal with deviations which play either (D,M)
or (D,N) for each task. Any other deviation can be deterred by setting
Y 000
R large enough.





R ,X R − Y 0
R = 0 (23)
Hdε − Km (24)
5 ε
©
XR − (1 − p0 (m) − pG (m))Y 0






XR − (1 − p0 (m) − pG (m))Y 0
R + pG (m)Y 00
R
ª
for m = G
10Each set of G tasks are chosen with equal probability; ε
(H−G)!G!
H! .
16where ph (m) is the probability that exactly h monitoring activities are found
out by the other player when you pick (D,M) for m tasks and (D,N) for




H(H−1)...(H−G+1) for m ≤ H − G +1
0 for m ≥ H − G +1
pG (m)=
(
0 for m ≤ G − 1
m...(m−G+1)
H(H−1)...(H−G+1) for m ≥ G − 1
The left hand side of (24) is the gain from playing DMm instead of CN. The
right hand side is the expected loss from such deviations. These conditions
mean that players are indiﬀerent between CN and DMG and prefer DMG
to DMm,m6= G as required by (LI).
Let f (m)=ε{XR − (1 − p0 (m) − pG (m))Y 0
R + pG (m)Y 00
R} + Km. A
suﬃcient condition for (24) is
Hdε = f (G) (25)
G =a r gm i n
0≤m≤H
f (m) (26)
Note that f is not diﬀerentiable at m = G − 1 and H − G +1 . Since
f00 (m) > 0 for any m 6= G−1 and H −G+1, The following conditions are









R + Y 00
R
¢ª
+ K =0 (First order condition) (27)
εp0
0 (G − 1)Y 0
R + K ≤ 0 (28)
εp0
G (G − 1)
¡
Y 0
R + Y 00
R
¢
+ K ≥ 0 (29)




R to satisfy (23), (25), (27) and (28).
We can solve for XR and Y 0
R in terms of Y 00






































The coeﬃcient of Y 00
R and the constant for Y 0





0(G) → 0 as H →∞ ,p 0
0 (G) < 0 and p0
G (G) > 0. Note also that
17the coeﬃcient of Y 00
R is smaller for XR. These imply that XR,Y0
R and Y 00
R
which satisfy (23) can be found by choosing appropriate Y 00
R i fa n do n l yi f
the constant of XR is larger than the constant of Y 0
R, that is,
Hdε − KG−



















¢ ≥ 0 (30)





G as H →∞ ,11 if we choose





G(G)) > 0 holds by assumption. Then
(30) is satisﬁed for any small enough ε for any such large H.
Since Y 0





G(G), (28) is also satisﬁed if
p0




K + K ≤ 0










1 as H →∞ .
Take any H such that (30) and (28) are satisﬁed for each H ≥ H.S i n c e ε
can be arbitrary small, the eﬃcient outcome can be arbitrarily approximated
for each such H.
Since a similar proof works for XP, the theorem is proved.
11Since H
pG(G)
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